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TOWARD ABOLITION OF INTERSPOUSAL TORT
IMMUNITY
Allan L. Karell
INTRODUCTION
Cessant ratione-cessat lex.1 This legal maxim applies to no
legal rule with greater vigor than it does to the doctrine of inter-
spousal tort immunity, which prohibits one spouse from suing the
other in tort. Drawing increasing criticism from courts and scholars
alike, the rule has been abrogated2 or substantially modified3 in a
rapidly increasing minority of states, although a majority of states
continue to cling to it.' State ex rel. Angvall v. District Court,5 the
most recent case dealing with the topic in Montana, has reaffirmed
the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity in this state, thus con-
tinuing Montana's adherence to the swiftly dwindling majority rule.
This note will discuss the origin and development of the immunity
rule, as well as analyzing the arguments pro and con for its contin-
ued application, with particular regard to Montana law.
1. When the reason for the rule ceases, the rule itself should cease. Rvmi CODEs o
MONTANA, §49-103 (1947) [hereinafter cited R.C.M. 1947].
2. Alabama: Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917); Alaska: Cramer v.
Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963); Arkansas: Katzenberg v. Katzenberg, 183 Ark. 626, 37
S.E.2d 696 (1931); California: Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal.2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102
(1962); Colorado: Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935); Connecticut: Brown v.
Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914); Idaho: Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733
(1949); Indiana: Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. 1972); Kentucky: Brown v. Gosser,
262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953); Michigan: Hosko v. Hosko, 385 Mich. 39, 187 N.W.2d 236 (1971);
Minnesota: Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); New Hampshire:
Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 95 A. 657 (1915); New Jersey: Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482,
267 A.2d 481 (1970); New York: Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943), codified
by N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATONs LAw § 3-313 (1964); North Carolina: Jernigan v. Jernigan, 236 N.C.
430, 72 S.E.2d 912 (1952), codified by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5 (1965); North Dakota: Fitz-
maurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932); Oklahoma: Courtney v. Courtney,
184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938); South Carolina: Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45, 102 S.E.
787 (1922); South Dakota: Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941);
Washington: Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972); Wisconsin: Wait v.
Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926) (wife can sue husband), but see Fehr v. General
Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 246 Wis. 228, 16 N.W.2d 787 (1944) (husband can't sue wife).
3. Arizona: Windauer v. O'Connor, 107 Ariz. 267, 485 P.2d 1157 (1971) (wife may
maintain action for intentional tort against husband after their divorce); Louisiana: Gremil-
lion v. Caffey, 71 So.2d 670 (La. App. 1954) (divorce terminates wife's incapacity to sue
husband for tort committed during coverture); Missouri: Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d
642 (Mo. 1955) (wife may sue for antenuptial tort); Oregon: compare Apitz v. Dames, 205
Ore. 242, 287, P.2d 585 (1955) (wife may sue for intentional tort) with Smith v. Smith, 205
Ore. 286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955) (wife may not sue husband for negligent tort); Virginia: Surratt
v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971) (wife may sue husband for negligence in
automobile accident).
4. For list of majority jurisdictions, see Note, Interspousal Immunity in Personal Torts
- Missouri's Position Clarified? 38 Mo. L. REv.) 333 n. 7 (1973).
5. State ex rel. Angvall v. District Court, 151 Mont. 483, 444 P.2d 370 (1968).
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ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE
Common Law
Interspousal tort immunity is a judicially created doctrine hav-
ing its origin in the common law. At common law, the married
woman was subject to numerous legal disabilities, which burdened
neither single women nor married men. The wife had no power to
contract, no power to sue or be sued in her own name, was not liable
for her debts, and her right to hold property was subject to her
husband's right to reduce personal property to his possession and to
receive the rents and profits from the real estate which he managed
for her. Thus, it was said that the husband and wife were deemed
to be one person in law, that person being the husband.' This con-
cept of the legal identity of husband and wife, thought to have its
roots in the Bible' or early Roman law,' created a substantive bar
to the existance of a cause of action by one spouse against the
other,'0 since no person could sue himself." Furthermore, the union
of husband and wife into a single legal entity, resulted in the union
of the right and duty to make compensation for tortious injury as
between the spouses, thereby discharging the duty and precluding
any cause of action from arising.'"
Even if a cause of action could have arisen, suit would have
been barred by a procedural difficulty. Although at common law a
married woman was liable for her tortious acts and acquired a right
of action for tortious injury, she lacked capacity to sue or be sued
in her own name, thereby necessitating joinder of her husband in
6. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 1030, 1031-
1032 (1930).
7. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 422 (1768); W. PBossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 122 (4th ed. 1971). But it should be noted that this was not strictly true as stated
in 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 430, 432, 433 (1768):
But the unity concept is inconsistent with most of the respective property rights of
the spouses at common law. It was applied in the criminal law to acts of the one
against the property of the other; but otherwise it was disregarded in criminal law.
It was not applied in non-interspousal torts committed by or against the person of
a married woman. It was disregarded in the courts of equity and was not applicable
in the ecclesiastical courts in determinations of validity and invalidity of marriage
and in divorces a mensa et thoro. It rather serves to sum up a result reached.
8. Genesis 2:23-"This is now my bones and my flesh. ; Ephesians 5:31-"They two
(husband and wife) shall be one flesh."
9. Comment, Interspousal Tort Immunity-California Follows the Trend, 36 So. CAL.
L. Ray. 456, 459 (1963).
10. Bassett v. Bassett, 122 Mass. 99 (1873). See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in
Domestic Relation, supra note 6; McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL.
L. REv. 303 (1959).
11. McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, supra note 10 at 305.
12. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, supra note 6 at 1033.
[Vol. 36
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any action to which she was a party. 13 Thus, a suit between husband
and wife would have been subject to the procedural disability of the
husband being both plaintiff and defendant.' As Professor
McCurdy appropriately concluded:
At common law, therefore, the combination of various incidents of
marriage, some substantive, some procedural, some conceptual,
made it impossible for one spouse ever to be held civilly liable as
a tortfeasor, in any situation, and without exception, to the other
for any act, antenuptial or during marriage, causing personal in-
jury which would have been a tort but for the marriage. 5
Married Women's Property Acts
The common law legal disability of the wife was modified to
some extent by the enactment in every state of married women's
property statutes," which generally empower a married woman to
hold and enjoy a separate legal estate in her own property and
endow her with the same civil and criminal remedies for the protec-
tion of that estate as if she were a "femme sole."" The effect of these
statutes on the common law disabilities of the married woman vary
from state to state, according to the specific statutory provision in
question' s and the construction given that statute by the state court.
Since the basic purpose of the statutes was to "emancipate a mar-
ried woman from her husband's control in property matters", courts
generally have agreed that the wife has enforceable property rights
against both the husband and third parties, and may sue in her own
name.' 9 However, in the absence of a specific statutory provision to
the contrary,20 a majority of courts have refused to extend the effect
13. Id. at 1032; McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, supra note 10 at 304.
14. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, supra note 6 at 1032 - 1033;
McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, supra note 10 at 304.
15. McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, supra note 10 at 307.
16. For a discussion of these statutes and their effect, see Id. at 310 - 322.
17. McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, supra note 10 at 307-308;
PROSSER, supra note 7 at 861.
18. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, supra note 6 at 1037, sug-
gests that remedially and procedurally, these statutes may be classified into seven general
groups:
(1) those which deal with property and are silent as to remedies; (2) those which
permit a married woman to sue or be sued only in respect to property which consti-
tutes her separate estate; (3) those which expressly exclude or refuse to authorize
suits between husband and wife; (4) those which do not permit a married woman
to sue or be sued by a third person alone in her own name for personal torts; (5)
those which permit a married woman to sue separately for torts committed against
her; (6) those which in terms permit suit by and against married women as though
they were sole; and (7) those which in terms permit suits between husband and
wife.
19. Id. at 1037-1041.
20. Ten states have statutes dealing expressly with interspousal suits. Prohibiting suit:
19751
3
Karell: Toward Abolition Of Interspousal Tort Immunity
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1975
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
of the statutes to permit personal injury tort suits between spouses.',
This conclusion has been supported on various theories. Some
courts argue that since no substantive cause of action existed at
common law, in absence of a statute that creates such a cause of
action, the substantive bar remains even though the statute gives a
married woman complete procedural capacity.2 Other courts em-
ploy the "reciprocity" argument, contending that since the statute
is not for the protection or benefit of married men, it cannot be
supposed that a cause of action was given to the wife and not to the
husband, who also lacked a cause of action at common law.23 It has
been argued in response, however, that if a woman is given a right,
she must be held to be subject to an equivalent duty, unless the
statute plainly provides otherwise.2 4 The existence in the wife of
both a right and a duty would thus permit suit either by or against
the wife.
One of the leading cases in this area which has provided the
basis for the conclusions of many of the majority courts is Thompson
v. Thompson.25 Involving an assault and battery suit by a married
woman against her husband under a District of Columbia statute
empowering married women to "sue separately . . . for torts com-
mitted against them, 26 the case held that:
The statute was not intended to give a right of action as against
the husband, but to allow the wife, in her own name, to maintain
actions of tort which at common law must be brought in the joint
names of herself and her husband.27
Montana, in Dutton v. Hightower & Lubrecht Construction
Company, has endorsed this position, holding that Montana's Mar-
ried Women's Acts are "procedural and create no new rights, but
only remove the common law disability of married women to enforce
their rights otherwise created and existing. '2
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 573-5 (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (1971); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
9.291 (1965); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 209, § 6 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 111 (1965).
Permitting suit: N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAw § 3-313 (McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
52-5 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07-05 (1971); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-216 (1962); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 246.075 (1967).
21. See discussion, supra note 4.
22. Dishon v. Dishon, 187 Ky. 497, 219 S.W. 794 (1920); Keister v. Keister, 123 Va. 157,
96 S.E. 215 (1918).
23. Heyman v. Heyman, 19 Ga. App. 634,92 S.E. 25 (1917); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss.
61, 100 So. 591 (1924); Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177 S.W. 382 (1915).
24. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, supra note 6 at 1050-1051.
25. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
26. D.C. CODE § 1155 (1925).
27. Thompson v. Thompson, supra note 25 at 617.
28. Dutton v. Hightower & Lubrecht Construction Company, 214 F. Supp. 298, 300 (D.
Mont. 1963).
[Vol. 36
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A substantial minority of states, however, have construed the
Married Women's Acts to allow personal injury suits between
spouses. 9 "[In allowing such actions no distinctions are usually
made between intentional and negligent conduct or whether the
action is brought during marriage or after separation, divorce, or
death." In the leading case of Brown v. Brown, sustaining an ac-
tion by a wife against her husband for damages for assault, battery,
and false imprisonment, the court construed the Connecticut Mar-
ried Women's Act broadly as effecting a change in "the foundation
of the legal status of husband and wife."3' After marriage, husband
and wife were held to retain their legal identities and to continue
in possession of those rights they had enjoyed before marriage, thus
abolishing the common law theory of unity and permitting one
spouse to sue the other in tort.31 Similarly, the Idaho supreme court
in Lorang v. Hays held that "in Idaho a married woman has a legal
status of her own. She is not submerged in the identity of her hus-
band. ' 33 The minority jurisdictions thus view the Married Women's
Acts as abolishing the common law unity of husband and wife, as
removing the common law disabilities of the wife, and as maintain-
ing the separate rights of the spouses in the marriage relation.
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Attempting to buttress the tenuous legal basis for interspousal
immunity, a number of courts have enunciated public policy argu-
ments in its support. However, even these policy considerations
have been subjected to increasing criticism on various grounds,
leaving the immunity doctrine with a weakening foundation of sup-
port.
Disruption of Domestic Harmony
The major policy argument offered in support of interspousal
tort immunity is that actions between spouses for personal torts
would disrupt the harmony, peace, and tranquility of the marriage.
Ritter v. Ritter, a leading case in support of this argument, noted:
The flames which litigation would kindle on the domestic hearth
would consume in an instant the conjugal bond, and bring on a
29. See list of cases, supra note 2.
30. McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, supra note 10 at 315. But see
discussion, supra note 3.
31. Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889, 891-892 (1914).
32. Id. The same result was reached in Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 A. 432
(1925) where the action was for negligence.
33. Lorang v. Hays, supra note 2 at 737.
19751
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new era indeed-an era of universal discord, of unchastity, of
bastardy, of dissoluteness, of violence, cruelty, and murders."
The rationale of this position, however, cannot withstand anal-
ysis. Proponents of the minority view have argued that if there is
marital harmony capable of disruption, the bringing of a tort action
will be highly improbable. 5 It is also likely that after a husband has
intentionally beaten his wife or committed other intentional torts
there will be little peace or harmony left to disturb .3 Furthermore,
denial of a remedy to the injured spouse may actually disrupt do-
mestic peace rather than preserve it:
No greater public inconvenience and scandal can thus arise than
would arise if they (husband and wife) were left to answer one
assault with another and one slander with another slander until
the public peace is broken and the criminal law invoked against
them .31
On the other hand, if interspousal suits were permitted, knowledge
that a tort action could be maintained might actually serve as a
deterrent to a potential wrongdoer and prevent the occurrence of the
wrong in the first instance. Finally, it is difficult to comprehend how
domestic peace may be disturbed to any greater extent by a personal
injury tort suit than it would by a property, divorce, or criminal suit,
which the states universally allow one spouse to initiate against the
other. 38
Flood of Trivial Litigation
A number of majority courts have argued against permitting
interspousal tort suits on the ground that their allowance would
open the courts to a flood of litigation. As the Supreme Court noted
in Thompson v. Thompson:
[Allowing such suits would] open the doors of the courts to accu-
sations of all sorts of one spouse against the other, and bring into
public notice complaints for assault, slander, and libel . . . by
husband against wife or wife against husband.39
34. Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 396, 398 (1858). See Thompson v. Thompson, supra note 25
at 618; Patenaude v. Patenaude, 195 Minn. 523, 263 N.W. 546, 547-548 (1935); Austin v.
Austin, supra note 23 at 592.
35. Brown v. Brown, supra note 31 at 891-892; Immer v. Risko, supra note 2 at 484;
Freehe v. Freehe, supra note 2 at 774.
36. W. PRossER, supra note 7 at 863.
37. Brown v. Brown, supra note 31 at 892. See Klein v. Klein, supra note 2 at 72.
38. Property: Self v. Self, 58 Cal.2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 69, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962); Brandt
v. Keller, 413 Ill. 503, 109 N.E.2d 729, 733 (1952); Brown v. Gosser, supra note 2 at 484.
Divorce: Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124, 140 P. 1022, 1024 (1914). Criminal: W. PaossE,
supra note 7 at 863.
39. Thompson v. Thompson, supra note 25 at 617-618.
[Vol. 36
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This fear of a potential avalanche of litigation was evident in the
decisions in Drake v. Drake, wherein the court declined to enjoin a
wife from nagging her husband,40 and in Wait v. Pierce, wherein the
dissent noted that "the uninvited kiss, no matter how cold and
chaste" would constitute an assault and battery, and thus provide
grounds for a potential suit.4
Such fears, however, have failed to materialize in those juris-
dictions which have abandoned the immunity rule. None of the
minority jurisdictions have reported a flood of trivial actions, "ei-
ther real or fancied."4 2 The Washington supreme court offered a
pragmatic explanation for the lack of any such flood by observing
that "we think it is fair to assume that few litigants would consider
it worthwhile to initiate such actions."' 3 It would indeed seem im-
probable that spouses would be willing to invest the necessary time
and money to seek costly court adjudication of a trivial matter
which could easily and more inexpensively be settled privately. Fur-
thermore, the mere possibility or unfounded apprehension of a mass
of trivial litigation should not preclude the courts from considering
those meritorious actions between spouses which justly require ad-
judication.44 To presume that the courts in our judicial system are
unable to distinguish between those suits which are meritorious and
those which are frivolous is to disparage the entire judicial process
as being incapable of administering justice.
Danger of Fraud and Collusion
A frequent rationale given for the retention of the majority rule
is that to allow personal injury tort suits between spouses would
engender fraud and collusion, particularly where insurance is in-
volved. As one court noted:
[Ilt is obvious that the risk of collusive action increases when the
parties plaintiff and defendant are in confidential relationship.
The risk of financial loss is ordinarily inducement enough to en-
courage a sturdy defense. Remove from a defendant the risk of loss
and substitute the covert hope of profit and a situation arises
which should give us pause.45
40. Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (1920).
41. Wait v. Pierce, supra note 2 at 482 (dissenting opinion).
42. Comment, Interspousal Tort Immunity-California Follows the Trend, supra note
9 at 466. See Klein v. Klein, supra note 2 at 72; Freeche v. Freehe, supra note 2 at 775, citing
Goode v. Martinis, 58 Wash.2d 229, 361 P.2d 941, 944 (1961).
43. Goode v. Martinis, supra note 42 at 944,
44. Spellins v. Spellins, 49 Cal.2d 210, 317 P.2d 613, 632 (1957) (concurring and dissent-
ing opinion).
45. Smith v. Smith, supra note 3 at 583.
19751
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Many courts contend that the inducement to such collusion is
greater than normal in the family situation because an award to one
spouse is, in effect, an increase in the family funds in which both
spouses may share.46 As one court pointed out: "[Allowing the wife
to recover from the husband] would be like the husband taking
money out of one of his pockets and putting it back in another."47
One New York court, envisioning even greater potential abuse of
such suit, has contended that no wife would want to sue her hus-
band except as a "raid on an insurance company." 8
This argument patently lacks merit. The possibility for fraud
or collusion exists in many types of litigation, but that fact alone
does not justify denial of the right to maintain those actions which
have merit.49 Courts must not abandon their obligation to adjudi-
cate bona fide controversies on the facile assumption that fraudu-
lent suits may abound. 0 Instead, "courts must depend upon the
efficacy of the judicial processes to ferret out the meritorious from
the fraudulent in particular cases."'"
The Indiana supreme court in Brooks v. Robinson12 was thor-
oughly convinced that the courts were endowed with adequate
means to ensure the prevention of fraud. Therein the court noted
that "it should not be overlooked that the testimony of both parties
will be extremely vulnerable to impeachment at trial on the grounds
of bias, interest, and prejudice."'5 Further, the validity of the liti-
gant's claim and testimony will be subject not only to the scrutiny
of the judge and opposing counsel, but also to that of the jurors who
cannot be presumed to "check their common sense at the courtroom
door."54 The California court in Klein v. Klein appropriately sum-
marized these arguments:
It would be a sad commentary on the law if we were to admit that
the judicial processes are so ineffective that we must deny relief to
a person otherwise entitled simply because in some future case a
litigant may be guilty of fraud or collusion . . . Our legal system
is not that ineffectual.5
46. Beaudette v. Frana, supra note 2 at 419. Although adopting the minority position,
the case is cited for a majority argument noted in the opinion.
47. Austin v. Austin, supra note 23 at 592.
48. Newton v. Weber, 119 Misc. 240, 196 N.Y.S. 113, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
49. Brandt v. Keller, supra note 38 at 733; Brown v. Gosser, supra note 2 at 484.
50. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149, 155 (1952) citing Rozelle v. Rozelle,
281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E.2d 254, 257 (1939).
51. Immer v. Risko, supra note 2 at 487.
52. Brooks v. Robinson, supra note 2.
53. Id. at 797.
54. Id. at 797, citing United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 620 (6th Cir. 1966).
B5. Klein v. Klein, supra note 2 at 73.
[Vol. 36
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Adequate Remedies Exist in Criminal and Divorce Courts
It is frequently stated that the wife is provided ample protec-
tion in the criminal and divorce courts, and that, therefore, there
exists no compelling need to provide her the additional remedy of a
tort suit against the husband. As one court concluded:
There is no necessity for [permitting the wife to sue her husband
in tort] . . . The criminal courts are open to her. She has the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus if unlawfully restrained. As
a last resort, if need be, she can prosecute at her husband's expense
a suit for divorce."
These conclusions, however, are untenable in light of various
considerations: 
57
(1) Ordinary negligence is nowhere a crime or a ground for di-
vorce.5
(2) The wife may have no desire to part with her husband by
divorce or through his imprisonment.
(3) If the husband is imprisoned, the wife will not be able to
benefit from her husband's legal duty to support her and she will
be thrown upon her own resources...
(4) A divorce action may not be adequate by way of compensa-
tion for damages. As Mr. Justice Sayre said in Johnson v. Johnson:
. . . The wife's remedies, by a criminal prosecution or an
action for divorce and alimony, which in some jurisdictions
are allowed to stand as her adequate remedies for wrongs of
the sort described in this complaint (assault and battery)
. . . appear to us to be illusory and inadequate.59
(5) A statute may not grant an action under the circumstances,
or
(6) Religious scruples may, on the part of the wife, prevent her
from attempting to secure [a divorce].
Thus, it can be seen that to deny the wife a tort action against her
husband actually denies her any kind of effective relief.
In addition to these considerations, it must be noted that re-
stricting an injured spouse to a divorce or criminal action against
the other spouse is logically inconsistent with any policy of preserv-
ing domestic tranquility. 0 The court in Abbott v. Abbott, a leading
56. Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 307 (1877). See Austin v. Austin, supra note 23 at
592.
57. Comment, Interspousal Tort Immunity-California Follows the Trend, supra note
9 at 466-467.
58. Id., citing W. PROSSER, supra note 7 at 674.
59. Id., citing Johnson v. Johnson, supra note 2 at 338. Accord, Goode v. Martinis, supra
note 42 at 944; "[While] a criminal action may be adequate to prevent future wrongs ...
it certainly affords no compensation for past injuries."
60. Freehe v. Freehe, supra note 2 at 775.
1975]
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case for the majority position, has even conceded that "instead of
settling, a divorce would very much unsettle all matters between
married parties."'"
Any Change Must Come From the Legislature
[Sluch radical and far-reaching results should be wrought by lan-
guage so clear and plain as to be unmistakeable evidence of legisla-
tive intent."
This language echoes the conclusion of some majority courts
that the proper body to effect any change in the interspousal im-
munity doctrine must be the legislature. These courts have reasoned
that the common law theory of unity of husband and wife precluded
the existence of a cause of action between spouses, and that even if
the Married Women's Statutes give married women procedural ca-
pacity, they cannot be construed to remove the substantive defect
of lack of a cause of action . 3 The burden therefore rests with the
various state legislatures to refrain from action and allow the im-
munity doctrine to continue or to abandon it by the creation, in
precise terms, of a cause of action between spouses.
An apparent explanation for this attitude of the courts is their
belief that the legislatures are better equipped to meet this chal-
lenge. As Mr. Justice Shauer stated in his dissent to Klein v. Klein:
When the legislature sees fit to change the common law rule it is
able-as we are not-to view the problem in all of its ramifications
and to provide the necessary safeguards against abuses of the law.'
The realities of the situation, however, do not support such an
argument. 5 Interspousal immunity is a judicially created doctrine
based on the common law fictional unity of husband and wife. Hav-
ing judicial origins, the doctrine is likewise subject to judicial modi-
fication or abrogation.6 Indeed, the court bears a responsibility
when applying a common law doctrine, to carefully scrutinize that
doctrine in order to ensure that "the conditions and needs of the
times have not so changed as to make further application of it the
instrument of injustice."67 It has been said that "the strength and
61. Abbott v. Abbott, supra note 56 at 309.
62. Thompson v. Thompson, supra note 25 at 618.
63. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, supra note 6 at 1050.
64. Klein v. Klein, supra note 2 at 75 (dissenting opinion).
65. But it should be noted that the majority argument is valid as to those few states
which have enacted statutes specifically prohibiting interspousal tort suits. In those states
(see list supra note 20), legislative action will be necessary to effect any change in the
statutory rule.
66. Brooks v. Robinson, supra note 2 at 797; Freehe v. Freehe, supra note 2 at 775.
67. State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 129 A.2d 715, 721 (1957).
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genius of the common law lies in its ability to adapt to the changing
needs of the society it governs, 68 and the court abdicates its respon-
sibility both to those litigants before it and to the public at large
when it neglects or refuses to scrutinize those common law rules it
summarily applies. As the Indiana supreme court aptly stated in
Brooks v. Robinson:
We cannot close our eyes to the legal and social needs of our so-
ciety, and this court should not hesitate to alter, amend, or abro-
gate the common law when society's needs so dictate."
THE MONTANA PosrrION
Montana Case Law
Conley v. Conley,7" a 1932 case of first impression in Montana
requiring the construction of Montana's Married Women's Stat-
utes,7' involved a suit by a wife against her husband for injuries
sustained while riding in his car, through the negligence of the hus-
band's chauffeur. In holding that such a cause of action could not
be maintained, the Montana supreme court grounded its argument
on the common law fictional unity of husband and wife and the
consequent substantive bar to an interspousal tort suit.7 2 Noting
that the primary purpose of Montana's Married Women's Statutes
was to free the wife from the husband's domination in property
matters,73 the court stated that:
... there is not seen the slightest intention to disturb the marital
unity except as to property rights; on the contrary, the mainte-
nance of the family is regarded with the highest solicitude.'
In addition, the court supported its adoption of the majority
rule on the basis of three policy considerations. - First, implicit in
that portion of the opinion previously quoted75 is the court's recogni-
tion of the importance of the maintenance of family harmony. Sec-
ond, the court implied that any change to be made in the doctrine
would have to be accomplished by the legislature, as evidenced by
68. Brooks v. Robinson, supra note 2 at 797.
69. Id.
70. Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922 (1932).
71. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 36-110, 36-128. Section 36-110. A married woman in her own name
may prosecute an action for injuries to her reputation, person, property, and character, or
for the enforcement of any legal or equitable right, and may in like manner defend any action
brought against herself. Section 36-128. A married woman may sue or be sued in the same
manner as if she were sole.
72. Conley v. Conley, supra note 70 at 925.
73. Id. at 923.
74. Id. at 924.
75. See discussion in text, supra note 74.
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its statement: "We see nothing in any of the . . . statutes to indi-
cate a purpose to create a right which neither husband nor wife had
at common law.""6 Finally, the court determined that to allow such
suit would create "the novel situation of the wife having a cause of
action against her husband for a personal tort, while the husband
would have no such right against his wife, since there is nothing in
Montana's statutes or constitution giving such a right to the hus-
band.77
In 1933 the court was faced, in Kelly v. Williams78 with the
similar question of whether a personal injury negligence suit could
be maintained by a wife against her husband's estate. In a painfully
brief opinion, the court succinctly noted the basis for its decision by
stating: "the case is ruled directly by the decision of this court in
Conley v. Conley."" In addition, the court concluded that the legis-
lature seemed satisfied with the Conley decision since in a recent
session a bill designed to enlarge the right of spouses to sue one
another "did not receive favorable attention even in the house in
which it originated."8
State ex rel. Angvall v. District Court"' provided the Montana
supreme court its most recent opportunity to re-evaluate the inter-
spousal immunity rule in light of the changed social and economic
conditions of 1968. The case involved an action by Patricia Angvall
against her husband Jon to recover damages for injuries sustained
when struck by an automobile driven by him. Rather than face the
challenge presented, however, the court merely reverted to its pre-
vious declaration that "in Montana the rule has always been that a
wife may not maintain an action against her husband for personal
injuries inflicted upon her by her husband while they are married. 8 2
Proceeding further, the court stated that "since no statute has
been enacted subsequent to the Kelly and Conley cases allowing a
wife to sue her husband for personal injuries he inflicts upon her,
the rule is still that as laid down in Conley and Kelly""3-an
apparent attempt by the court to buttress its previous argument
that any change in the doctrine must emanate from the legislature.
Apparently unconcerned that the rapid legal and social devel-
opments of the preceding four decades since the rule was first enun-
76. Conley v. Conley, supra note 70 at 925.
77. Id. at 926.
78. Kelly v. Williams, 94 Mont. 19, 21 P.2d 58 (1933).
79. Id. at 58.
80. Id.
81. State ex rel. Angvall v. District Court, supra note 5.
82. Id. at 370, citing Conley v. Conley, supra note 70 and Kelly v. Williams, supra note
83. Id. at 371.
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ciated in Montana might have rendered the doctrine outmoded and
unjust, the court did not even bother to re-articulate or to re-
examine the basis for the immunity doctrine. Rather, it merely
cited, without analyis, the previous cases establishing the rule. It is
submitted, however, that had the court re-examined the rule, it
would have discovered that the bases for the rule, both legal and
policy-related, no longer exist, and that its continued application is
unjustifiable.
Need for Change
Legal and social changes, wrought by both legislative enanct-
ment and changing societal conceptions of the married woman, have
eliminated the concept of marital unity of husband and wife, both
in theory and in fact. The married woman in Montana today enjoys
a separate interest in property,84 the right to contract both with her
husband and with third parties," the right to serve as an executrix,
administratrix, guardian or trustee,8 the right to sue and be sued
as if sole,87 and neither husband nor wife is answerable for the acts
or liable for the debts of the other.8 In addition, the 1972 Constitu-
tion of Montana specifically mandates equal protection of the law
for women by proscribing discrimination on the basis of sex by
either the state or individuals.89
It is doubtful today in light of the legal protection and societal
recognition of the rights of women, both single and married, that
any serious argument could be made in support of the fictional unity
of husband and wife. That concept has evolved from what was, at
best, a tenuous legal conclusion of the common law,1° to what today
may best be described as a legal anachronism, inapplicable in the
present state of the law. The common law unity concept having thus
been outmoded, there exists no legal basis for the continued applica-
tion of the interspousal tort immunity doctrine. Furthermore, as
previously discussed, the policy arguments typically cited by courts
in support of the doctrine are unpersuasive and likewise do not
merit its retention.
On the other hand, a number of policy arguments provide
strong support for the abolition of the doctrine. First, the purpose
of the law of torts is to provide a remedy for those injured by the
84. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 36-104, 36-111.
85. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 36-105, 36-130.
86. R.C.M. 1947, § 36-127.
87. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 36-110, 36-128.
88. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 36-109, 36-114, 36-129.
89. Montana Constitution, art. H, § 4.
90. See discussion, supra note 7.
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acts of another. As the court in Klein v. Klein aptly observed:
It is . . . fundamental in the law of torts that any person proxi-
mately injured by the act of another, whether that act be wilfull
or negligent, should, in the absence of statute or compelling rea-
sons of public policy, be compensated."
If a woman should be struck by a negligently driven car while cross-
ing the street and suffer severe injury, it makes little sense and
serves no rational purpose to deny that woman recovery on the mere
basis that she happens to be the wife of the tortfeasor. Such ration-
ale neither renders the injury any less real and painful nor any less
deserving of compensation.
The doctrine is particularly unjustifiable when it is considered
that spouses may sue one another in contract and property actions,
but not for personal torts. As the court in Brown v. Brown queried:
"If the wife may sue the husband for a broken promise, why should
she not be able to sue him for a broken arm?"" The policy argu-
ments which have been offered by the courts in support of the inter-
spousal immunity rule as to personal torts would seem to apply with
equal force to contract and property actions between spouses, yet
the courts have raised no great outcry against the maintenance of
such suits. It is difficult to imagine that allowance of personal injury
suits between spouses would create unmanageable problems when
similar actions for contract and property injuries have existed for
nearly a century without severe criticism.
Furthermore, allowance of property but not personal injury ac-
tions between spouses evidences an apparent belief that injuries to
property are more serious and merit more concern than do injuries
to the person. Such philosophy has no place in today's society as the
court in Brooks v. Robinson noted:
To make such a distinction renders the person of the wife in a
marriage completely subjugated to the will of her husband, as far
as civil liability is concerned, for wilfull and wanton injuries in-
flicted upon her person either before or during marriage, and that
such injuries are of no concern or value when placed in the scales
of justice alongside property rights. This seems to be inconsistent,
inhumane, and contrary to the true spirit and intent of the acts
passed for the emancipation of women in an enlightened civiliza-
tion.3
Certainly an individual's interest in mental and physical well-being
outweigh, or are at least on a par with, his or her economic interests
91. Klein v. Klein, supra note 2 at 72.
92. Brown v. Brown, supra note 31 at 891.
93. Brooks v. Robinson, supra note 2 at 795.
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in property. The law should adequately reflect the relative import-
ance of these interests.
Finally, the existence of liability insurance to compensate vic-
tims of negligent injury provides additional impetus for the aboli-
tion of the majority rule. The general availability of liability insur-
ance for car and home will ensure that the social costs of allowance
of interspousal tort actions are borne by the general public. The
writing of policies to cover negligent torts between spouses will in-
crease premiums and thereby shift the monetary burden from the
innocent victim to society at large. Should society be unwilling or
unable to bear this additional cost, insuarance policies may simply
be written to exclude coverage of the spouse.
CONCLUSION
The interspousal tort immunity doctrine is a legal anachron-
ism. The rapidly changing social and economic conditions of today
have destroyed the common law basis for the rule and have rendered
the doctrine a legal skeleton, unsupported by the muscle and sinew
of legal principle and practical common sense. The courts must not
allow judicial inertia to perpetuate a doctrine which lacks rational
foundation. As societal conditions and legal perceptions change, the
common law must be shaped and molded to reflect those changes,
and to thereby ensure the continued role of the common law as an
effective vehicle for the administration of justice. As Supreme Court
Justice Felix Frankfurter once thoughtfully observed: "Wisdom too
often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because
it comes late."94
94. Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l. Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (dissenting opin-
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